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Wireless mesh networks are highly susceptible to Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks
due to its self-configuring property. Flooding DDOS attack is one form of collaborative
attacks and the transport layer of such networks are extremely affected. In this paper
we propose ColShield, an effective and collaborative protection shield which not only
detects flooding attacks but also prevents the flooding attacks through clever spoof
detection. ColShield consists of Intrusion Protection and Detection Systems (IPDS)
located at various points in the network which collaboratively defend flooding attacks.
ColShield detects the attack node and its specific port number under attack. In order to
reduce the burden on a single global IPDS, the system uses several local IPDS for the
collaborative mitigation of flooding attacks. The evaluation of ColShield is done using
extensive simulations and is proved to be effective in terms of false positive ratio,
packet delivery ratio, communication overhead and attack detection time.
Keywords: Collaborative; Bandwidth; Traffic; Timer; IPDS; SpoofingIntroduction
Wireless mesh networks (WMN) has a wired-cum-wireless semi-centralized infrastruc-
ture that allows an end host to easily join the network and communicate with any host
by exchanging packets. WMN uses a high speed back-haul network that can transmit
packets at high bandwidth in large range. WMN consists of gateways that optimize the
network performance and integration with other wireless networks, intermediate mesh
routers that are stationary and mesh clients that are mobile. The mesh routers must be
synchronized [27] as it is the optimal feature of WMN. These mesh routers operate as
bridging points in inter-network and can be integrated with other wireless devices.
However, the mobility and self-configuring property of wireless mesh networks
(WMN) makes the attackers to prevent the internet’s service to legitimate users by
flooding excess amount of messages to the corresponding server thereby forming a
Denial of Service (DoS) attack. The main objective of DoS attacks is either to completely
tie up certain resources or to bring down an entire network so that the legitimate users
are not able to access service(s).2014 Jeba Jingle and Blessing; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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spoof-based flooding attacks can be traced easily if launched by a single attacker. The most
sophisticated type of DoS attack is the flooding attack [28] that occurs at all the layers of
WMN [11]. In case, if multiple attackers are collaboratively involved in launching flood
packets at the victim, it will lead to a Distributed Denial of Service attack which is one form
of collaborative flooding attack. The collaborative flooding DDoS attacks [42] are spread by
natural distributed processing architecture of the network. It normally floods the mesh cli-
ents and the intermediate mesh routers using hierarchal control points [37] to congest the
WMN traffic communication. Collaborative flooding DDoS attacks exploits the huge re-
source asymmetry between the internet and the victim. Collaborative flooding attacks
can bring the entire network down and they are very hard to detect because the at-
tack is distributed. Also it is impossible to trace the attacker. The attackers use a large
number of machines to collaboratively flood packets simultaneously at the victim. These
machines are ready to participate in the attack and are called as compromised machines
[31] or zombies. To avoid these issues, this paper focuses on spoof-based collaborative de-
tection of collaborative flooding DDoS attacks.
Intrusion detection systems [34] can be used to detect such collaborative flooding
attacks; however, they may have a high incidence of false alarms. Current rules-based
and anomaly-based intrusion detection systems detect intrusions either by matching
patterns of network and users activities with pre-defined rules or they define the normal
profile of system usages and then look for deviation. These approaches have their
consequences and drawbacks. The former is well suited for known intrusions but it
cannot detect new intrusions. The latter relies on deviation from normal usage and
sometimes fails to detect well known intrusions. This paper presents an effective
intrusion protection and detection system (IPDS) that detects and prevents collaborative
flooding attacks against clever spoofs at the mesh client level. ColShield comprises of a
distributed two-level architecture with group of local IPDS at the mesh router level
and a single global IPDS at the gateway router level. All these IPDS collaboratively
involve in protecting the source network from collaborative flooding of DDoS attacks.
This informative paper aims to be an opening to a research that could hopefully end
up with a mechanism to prevent flooding attacks.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section Related work summarizes the related work.
Section The proposed system describes the architecture and operation of ColShield system
and its metrics and algorithms. Section Performance results presents the simulations [29]
we conducted to evaluate ColShield. Finally Section Conclusion concludes the paper.Related work
DDoS attacks are quite advanced and powerful methods to attack a network system
and to make it either unusable to the legitimate users or downgrade its performance.
They are increasingly mounted by professional hackers in exchange for money and
benefits. Yet there seems to be no silver bullet to the problem. This survey examines
the possible solutions to this problem and analyzes the feasibility of those approaches.
Based on the analysis of existing solutions, we proposed a desirable solution to defend
collaborative flooding of DDoS. Firecol [1] uses Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) which
form virtual protection rings around the hosts to defend flooding attacks collaboratively
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port under attack. SACK2 [2] detects SYN flood attacks [5] against skillful spoofs. It does
by identifying the victim server and the TCP port being attacked by exploiting the behav-
ior of the SYN/ACK-CliACK pair. SACK2 has low and controllable false positive and false
negative rates as well as short detection delay. However, SACK2 can detect only SYN flood
attacks against skillful spoofs. TVA [24] uses capabilities to discard unauthorized traffic
floods on a single autonomous system. TVA achieves high throughput, but the problem is
TVA stores all capability information of each user on routers and a router with limited
number of queues may not be able to protect all the legitimate users.
DWARD [13] autonomously detects and filters attack traffic from legitimate traffic
by dropping the excess traffic by limiting the traffic rate to and from the victim thereby
reducing the overload at the victim. But DWARD cannot detect attack traffic until
connection buffer fills up thereby causing increased time delay to detect an attack
and it causes more communication overhead. DARB [4] uses an active probing detection
method and a TTL based rate-limit counteraction method to detect and filter SYN
flooding attack [26] traffic accurately and independently on the victim side. DARB con-
sumes more amount of the victim’s bandwidth and causes computation overhead for both
detecting and counteracting methods. Ge Zhang et al. [8] proposes a priority mechanism
for blocking attacks on SIP proxies caused by external processing. But this mechanism
causes time delay [41] and decreased throughput when SIP proxies interact with external
servers. Haidar Safa et al. [9] proposed CDMS that is implemented at the edge routers of
spoofed IP address’ networks to defend the victim. CDMS also a communication protocol
is used to encourage collaboration between various networks to protect each other. This
mechanism is very efficient and it prevents the routers from being overloaded. However
this mechanism causes time delay to detect and filter an attack. Sudip Misra et al. [20]
proposed DLSR which uses the concept of Learning Automata (LA) and prevents the
server being overloaded with excess amount of illegitimate traffic from crashing and
keeps the server functioning. However DLSR cannot effectively differentiate valid
user’s IP address and spoofed user’s IP address and it also causes excess time delay to
detect and filter an attack. Patrick P.C. et al. [17] proposes an online early detection
algorithm based on the statistical CUSUM method for detecting signalling DoS attacks on
wireless networks in a timely manner. This approach does not detect the attack traffic that
has a spoofed IP address and causes signaling load on the control plane. This mechanism
detects signaling DoS attacks by monitoring inter-setup time samples and blocks both
benign and malicious traffic when the signaling load reaches a threshold. Supranamaya
Ranjan et al. [22] proposed DDoS-Shield to detect the attack packets that overwhelm the
system resources such as bandwidth. DDoS Shield consist of a suspicion assignment
mechanism that examines requests belonging to every session (TCP,UDP,ICMP) and
assigns suspicion values to sessions and a DDoS-resilient scheduler that schedules the
sessions based on the values assigned to the sessions and decides which session to be
forwarded and when. The scheduler also performs rate-limiting. DDoS shield improves the
victim’s concert by consuming less memory for buffering requests and responses. However
DDoS Shield consumes more processing time and cannot produce good throughput.
Joseph Chee Ming Teo et al. [14] proposes a group key agreement protocol to protect
heterogeneous networks against DoS attacks. But it causes more communication overhead
in heterogeneous networks. Wei Chen et al. [23] proposes a storage-efficient data structure
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from incomplete ones. This mechanism leads to large memory consumption. Sungwon
Yi et al. [15] introduced a two-level cache Content Addressable Memory (CAM) to
dynamically detect and quarantine the unresponsive TCP flows [18]. But it leads to
large memory comsumption. Dimitris Geneiata et al. [7] proposed a two-part bloom
filter based monitor to detect and filter flooding attacks against proxy servers. The
monitor’s main task is to record the state of any incoming session in 3 different filters
and the filter is indexed through a hash function. This mechanism uses an alarming
system to trigger an alarm and report if any entries in the filter exceed the threshold
value. This mechanism is very efficient and cost-effective and causes reduced time
delay to detect an attack. However, hashing of entries in the filters leads to computa-
tion overhead and more CPU utilization. Dimitris Geneiatakis et al. [6] proposes a new
header to overcome signaling DoS attacks in SIP servers. But the scheme uses a pre-
shared key which when explored leads to password-based attacks and also it is vulnerable
to man-in-the-middle attacks. It is observed in [9] that collaborative flooding attacks
(DDoS) depend heavily on IP spoofing; therefore clever IP spoof detection might con-
tribute to solving the problem. A common way for preventing IP spoofing is by using
ingress and egress filters on firewalls [19]. But it fails in wireless networks where legit-
imate packets could have topologically incorrect addresses. In this paper, we have intro-
duced a spoof-based collaborative detection of collaborative flooding attack (DDoS).The proposed system
The ColShield system
The ColShield system (Figure 1) uses a semi-centralized architecture maintaining a group
of local IPDS that is installed near the local routers and a global IPDS that is installedFigure 1 ColShield architecture.
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collaborative flooding DDoS attacks. The ColShield system consists of four main com-
ponents which mutually involve in mitigating collaborative flooding DDoS attacks.
The Figure 1 shows the architectural view of the ColShield system. The ColShield
components are described as follows: The admission controller is responsible for allocating
initial bandwidth for each node using a bandwidth allocation algorithm. The admission
controller accepts the node that completes the registration process successfully. The nodes
have to initially register with the network by sending few confidential information. At the
end of registration process, the admission controller allocates a bandwidth bn and a band-
width validity time, i.e., TTL for each node. The traffic analyzer component comprises of
two components namely the timer monitor and the bandwidth monitor. The timer monitor
maintains the clock values [21,25] being sent periodically by each node. These clock values
are compared with the threshold value. The nodes that match the threshold value are for-
warded to the bandwidth monitor for analyzing the traffic abnormalities. Finally, the admis-
sion controller, the timer monitor and the bandwidth monitor altogether informs the
collaborative mitigation manager about their observation in abnormalities of each node.
The collaborative mitigation manager decides whether to accept or to reject the node
and its traffic. However, since the entire traffic cannot be possibly monitored
altogether by a single global IPDS component, we promote the usage of multiple
IPDS components for efficient detection and filtering of the attack.
The global IPDS maintains a node profile which consist of the following information
namely the client node’s IP address, the client node’s MAC address, the client node’s timer
value, the client node’s location proof information [30], the client node’s allotted bandwidth
and the TTL value. The global IPDS also maintains a local profile which consists of the IP
address of the local IPDS, the total number of client nodes connected to it and its neighbor-
ing local IPDS. The local IPDS maintains a profile which consists of the timer values of each
client node, the number of flows within each client node, its corresponding port number
and the corresponding client node to which the flow is being transmitted or received.Clever spoof detection
IP spoofing [10] is the main gateway for collaborative DoS attacks [9] which is considered
as a most complex attack in which the attackers create raw IP packets with valid IP and
TCP headers. An attacker might spoof a single source address or multiple source ad-
dresses. It is a difficult task for the listener to detect and filter the spoofing attacks with
multiple source addresses than detecting spoofing attacks with single source address.
Spoofing attacks can be prevented by using network ingress filters [3,12,16] and egress fil-
ters in proper network locations. IP Security (IPsec) also provides an excellent defense
against IP spoofing, but this protocol generally cannot be required because its deploy-
ment is currently not suitable to work with wireless mesh networks [32]. Filtering
does not solve the problem of collaborative flooding of DoS attacks and it is a quite
challenging task to block spoofing attacks with multiple source addresses. Hence
clever spoof detection is necessary to mitigate collaborative DoS attacks. The clever
spoof detection process is depicted in Figure 2 and it is carried out in two phases. The
admission controller initiates the detection process in phase 1 (Algorithm 1) and timer
manager completes the detection process in phase 2 (Algorithm 2). During phase 1, the
Figure 2 Clever spoof detection protocol.
Jingle and Rajsingh Human-centric Computing and Information Sciences 2014, 4:8 Page 6 of 19
http://www.hcis-journal.com/content/4/1/8bandwidth allocation is done for each node and in phase 2, the inter-arrival time samples
are monitored for each node. We monitor the inter-arrival time samples at each node in
order to detect the presence of IP spoofing in wireless mesh networks thereby providing a
way to mitigate collaborative flooding attacks.Admission controller
We model the backbone of the wireless mesh network (WMN) R as a directed graph
G = (V, E) where V represents the set of client nodes in the network and E represents
set of directed links. V =N +M where N = n1, n2,… nr is the set of registered nodes in
the network and each client node n ∉N. M is the set of monitor nodes in the network
and it is represented as M =Gm + {Lm} where Gm represents the global IPDS and Lm
represents the local monitor. The network consists of a group of intrusion protection
and detection systems (IPDS) with a single global IPDS, Gm and a cluster of local IPDS
Lm. Each client node n before it joins a network has to send a join request message, Rj
(n) to the global IPDS Gm. The Gm requests a confidential message REQc(n) to client
node n to prove its identity. The client in turn replies with its confidential message
RESc(n) to the Gm. The confidential reply message consists of four pieces of information
namely, IP address of the client node IPn, MAC address of the client node MACn, Timer
value of the client node zn(ti) and LPn, the location proof information [33] of the cli-
ent node which refers to the actual distance of the client node n from the global IPDS
Gm. zn(ti) = zn(tc) + Ksec where zn(tc) is the client node’s current time and Ksec is the
client node’s secret key. The length of the secret key Ksec is 16 bits and its initial value
is obtained by adding the least significant 8 bits of IP address with the least significant
8 bits of MAC address along with a 16 bit random number. These 32 bits are hashed
into a 16 bit secret key value which forms the length of Ksec. The subsequent values
of Ksec is incremented by 1 bit from the initial value every ti time interval. The LPn
value is obtained by adding the client node’s current distance from the global IPDS
Dn with the client node’s current available time zn(tc). Thus if a client node wants to
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checking the validity of confidential information, replies with a successful join and grants
a bandwidth bn along with TTL to the client node n. TTL is the bandwidth validity period
for client node n. The client node after receiving the bandwidth becomes a part of the
network. In this phase, the initial stage of spoof detection is done.Traffic analyzer
Each ColShield IPDS analyzes the traffic within its detection window range. The traffic
analyzer consists of two components of which the timer monitor completes the spoof
detection process and the bandwidth monitor [35] initiates the flood detection
process (Algorithm 3). The timer monitor involve in checking the periodic timer
values of each mesh client node. Each mesh client node after joining the network is
under the control of the local IPDS. The registered mesh client node, in order to
prove its identity to the local IPDS sends periodic timer values to its local IPDS, i.
e., Lm. The timer values are the inter arrival time samples of each mesh client node
being sent periodically. The local monitor checks the validity of the client node by
comparing whether the subsequent inter-arrival timer values match the threshold.
The local IPDS concludes the client node as abnormal if the inter-arrival timer
values did not match the threshold value by which spoofed node is detected. The
timer monitor is described by a timer function,
qn ¼ max E zn tð Þð Þ; zn tið Þð Þ ð1Þ
where E(zn(t) is the determined threshold value for node n and zn(ti) is the actual
real-time timer value of node n to be compared with. If zn(ti) = E(zn(t)) then qn = 0
and the timer value of node n is benign. If zn(ti) ≠ E(zn(t)) then the timer value of
node n is suspected to be malicious and has to undergo a condition check to confirm
the attack. zn(ti) values can exceed within an upper limit α and a lower limit β where
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greater than E(zn(t)) then the zn(ti) value for node n is considered to be malicious if it
exceeds the α value. (i.e.) zn(ti) + α = E(zn(t)). Likewise, if the zn(ti) value is less than E
(zn(t)) then the zn(ti) value for node n is considered to be malicious if it exceeds the β
value. (i.e.) zn(ti) − β = E(zn(t)). The local IPDS Lm monitors the periodic time samples of








zn tið Þ−βð Þjj zn tið Þ þ αÞð ð2Þ





























zn tið Þ þ αð Þ.
The bandwidth monitor has the responsibility to monitor the bandwidth consumption
of each client node. During this phase, the local IPDS involve in detecting flooding
attacks. The bandwidth monitor categorizes the traffic flow as normal and abnormal.
The traffic is said to be normal if the amount of bandwidth consumption adhere to the
limit and abnormal traffic consumes a higher bandwidth than the limit. The bandwidth
consumption in the sense includes the bandwidth consumed by a single node, per-node
per-flow bandwidth and per-node multiple-flow bandwidth. We consider the bandwidth
allocation for the global and local IPDS to be stable and predefined. Our aim is to allocate
bandwidth for each client node n ∉N and to monitor whether each client node utilizes
their allotted bandwidth. Let Iu be the bandwidth update interval which is the time
between the last bandwidth allocation and current bandwidth reallocation for each
client node. Each client node is permitted to utilize only their allotted bandwidth.
Nodes failing to use bn might have been deviated to bn′ . The deviation of bn and bn′
must not exceed ϖ. The local IPDS checks whether the fraction of bandwidth allotted
for each client node is normal. The local IPDS does this by using the formula, bn ≤ Br/
N where Br is the total bandwidth allotted to the mesh client nodes in the network.
The local IPDS checks whether the fraction of bandwidth utilized per-flow during a
single time interval by each client node is within the allotted bandwidth. The per-node
per-flow bandwidth is given by, bnf ≤ bn/Cn where Cn is the number of flows established
between a mesh client node and another. The local IPDS also checks whether the fraction
of bandwidth consumption for all flows per-node during subsequent time intervals.





where f represents the number of flows established between a mesh client node and
another node and t represents the time interval of the allotted bandwidth. If any
abnormalities were found, the local IPDS detects the attacker node and its port number.
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We focus on spoof-based collaborative mitigation of collaborative flooding DDoS attacks
(Algorithm 4) [36]. All the local IPDS and the global IPDS collaboratively involve in miti-
gating the flooding attacks (Algorithm 5). The local IPDS Lm executes the bandwidth mon-
itoring algorithm for detecting the attacker client node. Once it detects the attacker client
node, it first blocks the port number under attack and then blocks the future traffic to and
from the specified port number. It then informs the neighboring local IPDS NLm about the
Attacker IP Address ALERT Message
Figure 3 ALERT message format.
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tacker client node and an ALERT message which is depicted in Figure 3. Now the local
IPDS along with its neighbors inform the global IPDS about the attacker. When the global
IPDS receives the ALERT message, it blocks future traffic to and from that client node
under attack and revokes the allotted bandwidth from that client node. Now the client
node under attack is released from the network and it cannot communicate with the nodes
in the spoofed network. Thus flooding attack is collaboratively mitigated in this phase.
Again if the released node wishes to join the network, it has to re-register and obtain new
bandwidth from the network. The attacker in any case cannot bypass the bandwidth moni-
tor test and thus it fails which leads to repeated re-registration process. The effectiveness of
ColShield lies with the traffic analyzer which aims at analyzing abnormal traffic from the
client nodes. Our paper focuses on detecting spoof-based collaborative flooding attacks (i.
e., detecting collaborative flooding attacks that occur through IP spoofing). ColShield can
detect 85% of spoofed nodes and once spoofing attacks are detected, collaborative flooding
attacks are easily detected and mitigated because collaborative flooding attacks don’t have
much effect on spoof free nodes.ColShield metrics
ColShield maintains the following metrics:
1) Traffic flow metric: This metric helps to calculate the total number of
communications taken place in the network when we install the ColShield system
in the network. The total traffic flow at the global IPDS is given by,
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Xi
m¼1f out Lmð Þ ð5Þ
where fout(Lm) is the sum of all outgoing traffic flow coming out from all the local IPDS.
All mesh client nodes has to pass through the local IPDS to send and receive messages.
Therefore, the total traffic flow at the local IPDS is obtained by adding the total incoming
and outgoing traffic flow at each mesh client node. The total traffic flow at the local IPDS is
given by,
f Lmð Þ ¼
X
n∈N
f in nð Þ þ
X
n∈N
f out nð Þ ð6Þ
where fin(n) is the client node’s incoming traffic and fout(n) is the client node’s outgoing
traffic. The total traffic flow at the mesh client nodes is given by,
f nð Þ ¼
Xi
c¼1
f c nð Þ þ
Xi
d¼1
f d nð Þ ð7Þ
where fc(n) is the client node’s control flow traffic and fd(n) is the client node’s are the
control flow traffic and data flow traffic at the mesh client nodes.The control flow traffic at the mesh client node n is given by,f c nð Þ ¼ f cin nð Þ þ f cout nð Þ ð8Þ
where fcin(n) is the client node’s incoming control flow traffic and fcout(n) is the client node’s
outgoing control flow traffic. The data flow traffic at the mesh client node n is given by,
f d nð Þ ¼ f din nð Þ þ f dout nð Þ ð9Þ
where fdin(n) is the incoming data flow traffic at the client node and fdout(n) is the outgoing
data flow traffic at the client node. The total number of control messages exchanged
between the mesh clients, the local IPDS and the global IPDS are required to calculate
the communication overhead.
2) Throughput metric: The proposed system guarantees a minimum throughput of λ




The throughput is affected by the fraction of bandwidth allocated to each clientnode. The client nodes for which the bandwidth is allocated through the bandwidth
allocation protocol are considered for achieving wireless mesh network throughput.
3) Bandwidth allocation metric: bn is the fraction of bandwidth allotted to each client node
n∈N and Br = B − Bmb where B is the total bandwidth allotted to the network, Bmb is
the bandwidth allotted for the local and global IPDS and Br is the bandwidth allotted to
each mesh client nodes who joins the network. The bandwidth constraint is given by,
bn≤Br=N ð11Þ
4) Bandwidth deviation metric: The bandwidth deviation metric is given by,
dev bn; bn′ð Þ≤ϖ ð12Þ
Each client node is allotted a bandwidth bn within the network and they arepermitted to utilize only their allotted bandwidth. Nodes failing to use bn might
Figure 4 Collaborative mitigation protocol.
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value is 0.1. If the deviation exceeds ϖ then it leads to rejection of that client node.Performance results
We used NS-2 simulator for implementing WMN model for security [37,38] against col-
laborative flooding attack (DDOS). The model is adapted from the IEEE 802.11b/g based
adhoc network including the mesh clients that are mobile and backbone mesh routers
that are stable. The hierarchical architecture of the WMN was implemented using admin-
istrative domain (AD) cluster design. In the model, a gateway router was statically
assigned as global IPDS and the local routers are statically assigned as local IPDS while
the client nodes are enabled using random waypoint wireless model as mesh clients. In
addition, the gateway router is assigned as back-bone router. The adhoc network security
standard IEEE802.11i was used for simulation due to the ongoing standardization of
WMN security. We have compared the performance of ColShield with FireCol. We use
the following metrics for evaluating the performance of ColShield: 1) false positive ratio 2)
detection time 3) packet delivery ratio and 4) communication overhead 5) average
throughput 6) bandwidth consumption and 7) registration overhead.
1) Packet delivery ratio (PDR): It is the ratio of the total number of packets
delivered to the mesh client to the total number of packets received at the local
IPDS. The local IPDS delivers those packets that wins the timer manager
protocol and the bandwidth monitor protocol. Figure 5 shows the packet
delivery ratio of ColShield with respect to the percentage of local IPDS. The
PDR is reasonably good and does not affect the performance of the network.
Figure 5 Packet delivery ratio over percentage of local IPDS.
Jingle and Rajsingh Human-centric Computing and Information Sciences 2014, 4:8 Page 13 of 19
http://www.hcis-journal.com/content/4/1/82) False positive ratio: The false positive rate is the amount of legitimate traffic
wrongly detected as malicious. Since each IPDS store the full TCP connection
information, it can have false rates. However, this will not affect the final detection
behavior. Figure 6 shows the false positive rates of FireCol and ColShield with
respect to the percentage of local IPDS. The false positive ratio is roughly increased
to 5% which is acceptable and does not affect the final detection results.
3) Attack Detection Time: The attack detection time is the delay between the attack
occurs and when it is detected. The detection of flooding attack [39,40] is based on
detection of increase in a client node’s clock inter-arrival times. Figure 7 shows the de-
tection delay for FireCol and ColShield. The ColShield can detect the start of the at-
tack within one detection time interval and end of an attack within two detection time
periods. The proposed method can achieve more accurate detection with a shot
latency. When the percentage of local IPDS increases, the attack detection time is less.Figure 6 Comparison of false positive ratio.
Figure 7 Comparison of attack detection time.
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between the mesh clients, the local IPDS and the global IPDS. Compared to the mesh
client level and the gateway router level, the maximum number of communications
take place at the mesh router level. The communication overhead is obtained by
summing up the total traffic flow at the global IPDS and the local IPDS. The
communication overhead for ColShield is depicted in Figure 8. The figure shows the
percentage of data messages and control messages being transmitted in the wireless
mesh network. Only 20% of control messages are exchanged within the system which
is comparetively less than the total number of data packets exchanged in the system.
The communication overhead does not affect the performance of the network.Figure 8 Communication overhead over percentage of local IPDS.
Figure 9 WMN throughput over number of local IPDS.
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nodes in the network in a given time unit (seconds). The throughput is affected by
the fraction of bandwidth allotted to each client node in the network. Figure 9
shows the WMN throughput with respect to the percentage of local IPDS. The
client nodes that obtain bandwidth through the bandwidth allocation process are
eligible for achieving WMN throughput.
6) Attack detection ratio: It is the rate at which the spoofing attacks and the flooding
attacks are detected. When the network size increases the percentage of local IPDS
increases which leads to the increase in attack detection ratio. Once the spoofing
attacks are detected, the flooding attacks are detected easily in a timely manner.
Figure 10 shows the attack detection ratio of the ColShield system with respect to
the percentage of local IPDS in the WMN. The attack detection ratio calculates theFigure 10 Attack detection ratio over percentage of local IPDS.
Figure 11 Bandwidth deviation over percentage of rejected nodes.
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http://www.hcis-journal.com/content/4/1/8percentage of spoofing attack detected by the system while running the bandwidth
allocation process and the timer monitor protocol. The attack detection ratio also
calculates the percentage of flooding attacks detected by the system while running
the bandwidth monitor protocol. The attack detection ratio for spoofing attack and
flooding attack is reasonably good which is the goal of the ColShield System.
7) Bandwidth deviation: It is the fraction of deviated bandwidth from the allotted
bandwidth. Figure 11 shows the percentage of bandwidth deviation with respect to
the percentage of rejected nodes. The percentage of rejected nodes increases when
they cross the threshold value ϖ. It is strictly followed that nodes that have a
bandwidth deviation beyond the threshold value are rejected.
8) Registration overhead: The number of communications and the number of
computations required by a client node during the registration process determines
the registration overhead (Figure 12). A single client node communicates four messages
to complete the registration process. But each node requires X-OR computations for a
single timer value to complete the registration process, which is reasonable. TheFigure 12 Registration overhead over percentage of local IPDS.
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client nodes, to allocate bandwidth as well as to analyze traffic and to effectively
mitigate spoof-based collaborative flooding attacks. The computation overhead can be
balanced by placing reasonable number of local IPDs in the network. As the number
of local IPDS increases in the network, the computation overhead is tolerated to 60%.
ColShield effectiveness relies on the collaboration between different IPDS. The
ColShield cannot be enabled on all routers. The IPDS are routers that perform
detection and forward messages to the neighboring routers and the global IPDS. An IPDS
communicates with neighboring IPDS only for signaling collaborative information. Thus
only 20% of communication overhead is caused in the network which does not affect the
performance of the network.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an effective flood detection and prevention architecture,
ColShield to detect flooding attacks and also report the specific victim client node
and port being attacked. ColShield does not give any chance for an attacker to evade
the detection. The time taken to detect the start of an attack is less than one detection
interval and the time taken to detect the end of an attack is less than two detection
intervals. Through simulations, it is demonstrated that ColShield is the fastest and
most accurate detection method compared with FireCol.
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